The Hard Challenge of Aid Coordination by Bourguignon, François & Platteau, Jean-Philippe
The Hard Challenge of Aid Coordination
Franc¸ois Bourguignon, Jean-Philippe Platteau
To cite this version:
Franc¸ois Bourguignon, Jean-Philippe Platteau. The Hard Challenge of Aid Coordination. G-
MonD Working Paper n33. 2013. <halshs-00960575>
HAL Id: halshs-00960575
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00960575
Submitted on 18 Mar 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Hard Challenge 
of Aid Coordination 
 
 
 
 
François BOURGUIGNON 
 
PSE 
Jean-Philippe PLATTEAU 
 
University of Namur 
 
 
June 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G-MonD      Working Paper n°33 
 
For sustainable and inclusive world development 
The Hard Challenge of Aid Coordination
François Bourguignon∗and Jean-Philippe Platteau†
May 13, 2013
Abstract
Aid coordination is a constant theme of discussion among national and
international aid agencies in their search for more effectiveness and effi-
ciency in delivering development assistance. This paper seeks to clarify
some of the arguments currently made in support of aid coordination, and
to precise unavoidable trade-offs born of the existence of political costs.
It is anchored in the available literature on aid delivery while focusing on
the implementation problems of aid coordination among donor countries.
In particular, it deals with: a) the issue of consistently and collectively
handling possible governance failures in recipient countries; and b) the
impact of heterogeneity of donor countries on the effectiveness of aid co-
ordination.
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1 Introduction
The need for aid coordination has become a recurrent theme in the discussions
and strategic thinking of national and international aid agencies. The Paris
Declaration (March 2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (September 2008)
thus mentioned aid coordination as one of the key mechanisms to be mobilized
with a view to enhancing aid effectiveness. The signatories, indeed, made a
commitment to eliminate duplication of efforts and rationalize donor activities
so that they become as cost-effective as possible. The European Union (EU), in
particular, has enshrined the importance of aid coordination with other donors
in several policy documents: Consensus on Development (2006), the Code of
Conduct on Division of Labour (2007), and the Operational Framework on Aid
Effectiveness (2009) based on the international aid effectiveness agenda. Among
the ambitious goals featured in these documents are the following: a better
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alignment of donor priorities with partner countries’ development strategy, the
donor harmonization of conditionalities, improved mutual accountability and
transparence, management for results, the delegation to a leading donor of the
responsibility of managing aid to a particular country, co-financing arrange-
ments, and even joint programming and the pooling of aid resources destined
for recipient countries.1
The gains of aid coordination from the standpoint of donor countries can
be usefully thought of as belonging to the categories of cost savings and gov-
ernance benefits. Cost saving effects are expected to result from a substantial
reduction in the individually borne transaction costs accompanying the various
steps involved in the aid delivery process: exploratory missions, negotiations,
delivery, monitoring, follow up, and evaluation. As for the governance effects,
they are caused by a more effective implementation of conditionalities and bet-
ter monitoring of aid uses, on the one hand, and higher levels of aid ownership
and transparence, on the other hand. The poor in the recipient countries ought
to be better off as a consequence of those improvements of governance and the
more rational use of their scarce human capital resources. For donor countries,
the main shortcoming of aid coordination is the loss of national sovereignty
and the impeded ability to pursue national objectives through aid programs.
For recipient countries, it is their diminished independence owing to reduced
competition among donors.
Given the variety of effects likely to result from aid coordination schemes
and the serious obstacles in the way of their realization, which add to their un-
certainty, efforts to quantify the benefits of such schemes are extremely perilous
(see the contribution of Bigsten in this issue for a recent attempt to assess the
benefits of aid coordination among European countries). Our purpose in this
paper is rather to clarify some of the arguments in support of aid coordination in
the light of the unavoidable trade-offs born of the existence of political costs.Our
discussion is anchored in the available literature but also proceeds by delving
into the implementation problems. In particular, it sets about highlighting (1°)
the difficulty of carrying out punishment against lapsing recipient governments,
and (2°) the impact of heterogeneity of donor countries on the effectiveness of
aid coordination.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the scant
economic literature that touches on the issue of aid coordination on a theoretical
level, either directly or indirectly. In Section 3, we analyze the issue of aid
coordination as a n-player coordination game in which multiple equilibria exist.
We also highlight the trade-off between the poverty reduction motive and the
political sovereignty of donors and lay the grounds for an analysis in those terms.
In Section 4, we examine the case of homogenous donor countries assuming
that their number is pre-determined and they are free to choose the intensity
1Interestingly, effective coordination of aid programs is a legal obligation for the Union
and its Member States. Article 210 of the Lisbon treaty thus states: “In order to promote
the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union and the Member States shall
coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid
programs including in international organisations and during international conferences”.
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of their coordination efforts. In Section 5, we turn to the more interesting case
of heterogeneous countries and attention is focused on the role of their size and
preferences, and the manner in which these factors affect the feasibility and
effectiveness of aid coordination programs. In Section 6, we discuss the case of
Mali, which was selected by the Committee for Development Aid of the OECD
as pilot country to initiate a review of aid effectiveness in 1996. This case study
material brings into light a number of hurdles against effective aid coordination
that were not addressed in the preceding analysis. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Aid coordination as a mechanism of incentive
alignment
In the following, we start by reviewing two theoretical papers which directly
address the problem of aid coordination by assuming the existence of multiple
donors. Thereafter, we look at a number of papers which use a single donor
framework to analyze aid delivery but conclude that aid must be coordinated
to align incentives in the recipient countries with those of the donor.
2.1 Theories based on a multiple-donor framework
To begin with, Knack and Rahman (2004) examine how alignment of incentives
is affected by the presence of multiple donors that independently provide aid
to a poor country. Their contribution, focuses on staff recruitment by donors
in the recipient countries. Each donor is assumed to maximize the poverty
reducing impact of its own projects, and project success is assumed to increase
at a decreasing rate with the amount of skilled local staff time dedicated to the
project. The authors compare the optimal level of administrator time devoted
to each project when maximization takes place individually with the optimal
level when donors seek to jointly maximize the poverty reduction impact of their
projects. The central result is that the number of administrators to be hired
declines when the concern of a particular donor for the success of the projects
of other donors increases. Lack of coordination thus leads to excessive donor
recruitment of administrators, thus causing unnecessary stress on the demand
for scarce (staff) resources in the recipient countries.
Torsvik (2005) considers a group of rich countries that independently provide
aid to a poor country, and how incentive alignment is affected by the presence
of multiple donors aimed at poverty reduction. Since there are several donors,
poverty alleviation in the poor country becomes a public good: if one donor
provides aid, it has a positive effect on the welfare of all the other donors. As
is typical in such situations, non-cooperation between the donors leads to an
undersupply of aid. Cooperation or coordination between donors is therefore
desirable to bring total aid amount closer to its social optimum.
The next question addressed by Torsvik is how foreign aid affects policy in
the recipient country. If the donors can use enforceable conditional aid contracts
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to influence the recipient’s policy, they are always better off with coordination
than without it. When the donor-recipient relationship is not contractible, how-
ever, the recipient government has an incentive to exploit the poverty aversion
of the donors to its own advantage, by reducing domestic transfers to the poor
when aid for the poor is externally provided (the crowding-out problem).
Torsvik investigates this question by examining two different interaction
regimes. First, if the donors are able to commit not to increase their aid in
response to crowding out by the recipient governement, then all of them make
simultaneous moves in a non-cooperative game-theoretic setup. Donor coop-
eration has then the effect of increasing foreign support but also encouraging
crowding-out. The incomes of the poor increase when donors coordinate their
efforts and provide more aid than before, but it is not obvious that the utility of
the donors increases as well.2 In order that donor coordination proves beneficial
from the donors’ viewpoint, the government of the recipient country must have
enough aversion to poverty to limit the crowding-out problem.
Alternatively, because of their strong aversion to poverty, donors may be
unable to commit not to help the poor in response to crowding-out (’Samari-
tan dilemma’). Knowing that, the recipient country reduces the support for its
own poor, ex-ante, in order to trigger more aid. In such a setup (donors act
as Stackelberg-followers), donor coordination would again lead to increased aid
flows, but not necessarily to more crowding-out. This is because, as a response
to a fall in the support of the recipient country to its poor, they would increase
total aid to a lesser extent when they cooperate that when each donor acts inde-
pendently. Recipient governments are thus more effectively disciplined through
donor coordination when the donors are unable to commit not to help the poor,
that is, when they hold a weak bargaining power.
To sum up, when the recipient country’s government shares the goals of
the donors (it is equally averse to poverty), aid coordination is unambiguously
beneficial. In the opposite case of diverging interests, however, coordination
is not necessarily beneficial if contracts cannot be effectively used to align the
interests of the recipient country with those of the donors, and if the latter
do not face a Samaritan dilemma. According to intuition, when the recipient
government is in a position to exploit the donors’ generosity, its ability to do so
is more effectively controlled through donors’ coordination if the donors make
their decisions regarding the amount of aid after it has itself decided how much
of it will be transferred to the poor.
2.2 Theories based on a single-donor framework
Let us now turn our attention to theoretical works that use a single-donor frame-
work to study aid effectiveness. A useful point of departure is the pioneer con-
tribution of Azam and Laffont (2003) who use a principal-agent framework to
2This is because their utility is negatively affected by the fall in the consumption of their
own citizens, while the positive effect of the increased consumption of the poor in the recipient
country, which is not optimal as a result of the crowding-out problem, may be insufficient to
compensate the negative effect.
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determine the optimal aid contract. This contract specifies that the recipient
government will receive an aid amount (which is endogenous) linearly dependent
on the level of consumption of the poor that it provides.
Azam and Laffont put emphasis on the adverse selection problem: recipient
countries vary in terms of the quality of their governance, and the donor ignores
these quality levels when deciding about aid flows. Their prescription is that
the donor should avoid giving aid to the worst-governed countries as this would
deprive its own citizen without the poor in the recipient country getting much
of it. To improve the situation, the authors propose that the donor community
relies on a specialized international agency that would collect information about
governance levels. Donor coordination, in this instance, would increase the
neglect of the poor in the worst-governed countries.
Svensson (2000) and Svensson (2003) explicitly looks at conditionality as
a way to mitigate the moral hazard problem of opportunistic recipients. He
analyzes a two-stage game among two recipient countries and the donor.The
optimal aid contract specifies the amount of aid disbursed as a function of the
good or bad state of nature that prevails and reform effort helping the poor.
Yet, as reform effort, is assumed to be non-observable and non-contractible, the
second-best contractis such that it induces the recipient to exert higher effort
through aid flows being lower in bad states and higher in good states (more
likely to occur when reform effort has been higher)(p. 70).
Like Torsvik, Svensson stresses a serious commitment or time-inconsistency
problem on the side of the donor: ex post, the donor is tempted to increase
disbursements to the country most in need. Anticipation that this will happen
in turn lowers the recipient’s incentive to carry out politically costly reform
policies ex ante (2000, p. 70). A mechanism that may possibly mitigate the
donor’s commitment problem is to delegate aid management to an external
agency with low poverty aversion, so as to avoid the time inconsistency caused
by the donor’s sensitivity to poverty. This delegation clearly is an act of aid
coordination.
Gaspart and Platteau (2003) and Gaspart and Platteau (2010) use a one
donor-one-recipient framework to probe into the conditionality mechanism con-
sidered as a means of disciplining opportunistic local elites. They posit a costly
fraud detection function (the leader’s decision is imperfectly observable) and a
punishment mechanism (the leader and community are deprived of subsequent
aid tranches if the former is caught). Yet, in all these papers, and through differ-
ent channels, competition among donors causes the external discipline exerted
on the leader to be loweredat the expense of the intended beneficiaries.
Donors competition may thus yield perverse effects, as analyzed in Platteau
(2003). What is at work in the present case is a mechanism, labeled by Avner
Greif (1994) ’Bilateral Reputation Mechanism’ (BRM) in analyzing relationships
between traders. If caught embezzling funds, a local elite are punished only by
the aid agency or the donor that has actually provided the funds embezzled.
Because of competition among donors, they are indeed ready to shift to another
agency and start cheating again. Alternatively, the presence of other donors
puts a ceiling on the severity of the aid delivery package that a given agency
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may propose so as to reach more effectively the poor in the recipient country,
as in Bourguignon and Platteau (2013).There are apparently two ways whereby
this ‘elite capture’ problem can be mitigated. Reducing competition through
concentration of aid supply in the hands of fewer agencies or donors is the first
way but would be difficult to impose in what is essentially a free entry activ-
ity. The second solution consists of a coordination mechanism whereby donor
agencies would mutually inform each other about fraudulent acts committed
by intermediaries or local leaders.3 If this Multilateral Reputation Mechanism
(MRM) (Greif (1994)) is apparently more feasible than attempts to reduce com-
petition, it is not devoid of serious practical difficulties that we highlight in the
next subsection.
2.3 Information centralization as a mechanism of donor
coordination
Applied to our problem, the MRM would work as follows. Operating within a
repeated-game framework, a donor agency would adopt the strategy whereby it
grants money to a country or area, but only provided that it is not known to
have cheated another agency some time in the past. If money is thus disbursed
and the benefiting country is later found to have cheated the agency, the latter
dutifully reports the fraud and communicates the name of the fraudulent country
to the other members of the donor community. Before embezzling funds, a
country’s elite or government would thus be incited to think twice because by
cheating today it would spoil its reputation for future interactions with the
whole donor community. The MRM is an equilibrium strategy. That is, if a
government expects every donor agency to adopt such a strategy, its interest
is to transfer the aid fund to the intended project beneficiaries. Knowing that
reaction, the interest of all donor agencies is to cling to the MRM. Honest
behaviour therefore gets established as a (Nash) equilibrium.
There are several problems with the MRM, however.4 The first one stems
from the fact that the information conditions that must be fulfilled for it to work
are extremely stringent: information must circulate perfectly between donor
agencies. This is hard to obtain when donors are numerous and heterogeneous
in terms of several key characteristics (size, preferences, methods, time horizon,
etc.).
Is the establishment of a private third party charged with centralizing in-
formation (as suggested by Milgrom et al. (1990)) the solution to the problem
caused by the costliness of generating and communicating information? Such
a system can effectively work only if donors have an incentive to detect fraud
and report fraudulent experiences to the third party. However, in so far as the
detection and reporting of a fraud once it has occurred entails costs but brings
3For a discussion of alternative coordination mechanisms, such as codes of conduct, om-
budsmen, social auditing and accreditations, see Ebrahim (2003), pp. 819-24.
4We ignore the problem that, in order to counter the elite’ temptation to embezzle funds,
donors should in theory give them a flow payment or rent each period, and this flow should
be at least equal to the interest on the one-off embezzlement of aid they could carry out.
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no benefits to the individual agency which has been cheated, such an incentive
does not exist.
In order to create adequate incentives, the third party should be able to
exercise pressure on the detected fraudulent leader so as to make it return
the stolen money to the original donor. As a result, so the theory goes, the
threat against potential recipients would be effective and, if caught, a fraudulent
government would be prompted to comply with the third party by returning
the money stolen (so that its name is removed from the black list). This said,
honesty will be established as a (symmetric sequential) equilibrium under the
above mechanism only if a number of conditions are met, in particular, the
cost of the various steps in the whole procedure (information query, appeal to
the third party, recovery of the stolen money) is not too high. Unfortunately,
some of these assumptions are likely to be violated so that the mechanism is
not self-enforcing.
A second problem lies in the fact that local elites or governments may not be
actually concerned with preserving their reputation because their time horizon
is short and they could be quite happy with running away with the money stolen
from one single project.
Finally, one key actor has been missing from the foregoing discussion, namely
the ultimate purveyors of funds from whom donor agencies obtain their finan-
cial resources. They are taxpayers for national and international organizations,
or the general public mobilized in fund-raising campaigns for NGOs. A serious
dysfunctioning of the MRM arises if donors expect their ultimate sponsors to
react negatively to news of embezzlement in their projects. A donor organi-
zation may have no incentive to report the acts of malfeasance detected in its
projects if it believes that other agencies will refrain from revealing their own
bad experiences. That the above risk is real is evident from the atmosphere
of secrecy that surrounds the activities of many donor organizations, including
NGOs. To reduce such a risk, there is no other way than improving the general
public’s understanding of aid delivery processes and the possibility of failures,
so that honest donors which openly admit of cases of cheating are not unfairly
sanctioned to the benefit of more opportunistic ones.
Central funding bureaucracies (such as the European Union) could possiby
surmount several of the above problems through coordination. In particular,
they could establish a rating of donor agencies based on criteria that avoid re-
warding success while punishing failure since such criteria encourage the under-
reporting of failures (Edwards and Hulme (1996), p. 189). Self-reported cases of
fraud detection could thus be considered as indirect evidence of the effectiveness
of monitoring activities rather than as signs of failure.5
The need for a proper evaluation of aid agencies is all the more pressing as,
side by side with serious agencies, there exist careless organizations that are not
equipped with proper monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. They tend to
disburse funds quickly either because they do not have a good understanding of
5Note that outcome measures, assuming that they are feasible, are not ideal yardsticks
inasmuch as they induce aid agencies to select communities or countries where outcomes can
be more easily attained.
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the game, or are not single-mindedly pursuing the objective of poverty allevia-
tion. The second problem arises when, in spite of all their pro-poor rhetoric, aid
organizations are concerned with reproducing themselves as job- and income-
providers for their employees.In the same way that “bad money chases good
money”, the operation of these opportunistic aid agencies risks driving ‘good’
agencies out of business or, else, it will force them to relax or altogether give up
their gradual and conditional disbursement procedures.
3 Participation in an aid-coordinating scheme: a
broad framework
In this section, we pursue two different objectives. First, we represent the issue
of aid coordination as a n-player (pure) coordination game, which allows us to
characterize the multiple equilibria that are associated with it. Second, we lay
the grounds for the model to be expounded in the next section by highlighting
a trade-off between poverty reduction (the altruistic aim of the donors) and
political sovereignty.
3.1 The conditionality mechanism as a coordination game
The reason why aid coordination may have positive effects on the level of gover-
nance becomes clear as soon as one realizes that aid governance can be conceived
as a public good. If a country is alone in setting conditions aimed at improving
governance in a recipient country, the benefit from conditionality is likely to be
small because of the recipient country being able to turn to other, more lenient
donor countries. The conditionality-imposing country which will therefore for-
sake its strategy or weakens it conditionality. To overcome that obstacle, there
must obviously be a sufficiently large group of donor countries willing to engage
in the governance-improving process, thus lending it a collective character.
In fact, the conditionality mechanism resembles an n-player pure coordina-
tion game in the sense that there exists a critical threshold of players beyond
which it becomes individually profitable for each participating player to bear the
cost of collective action or contribution to the public good. All that is needed is
that the individual benefit increases with the number of contributors: if the cost
of individual contribution is constant, there will necessarily be a critical number
of contributors such that the individual benefit starts exceeding the individual
cost of participating.
Precisely the same point can be made in regard of ownership and trans-
parency, two critical dimensions of the Paris agenda. It can, indeed, be argued
that, without donor coordination, there is a great temptation for the recipient
country to tailor development objectives and to present results according to the
perceived preferences of each individual donor so as to extract maximum rents.
In front of a sufficiently large group of donor countries, on the other hand, the re-
cipient country is better disciplined into pursuing ambitious priorities, adopting
adequate strategies and being more transparent on results.
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Let us now illustrate the above argument with the help of a simple frame-
work. Assume that there are N players and implementing aid coordination (the
public good) yields individual benefits to each member of the group equal to
b(m), where m stands for the number of voluntary contributors. Adopting a
continuous framework and logically assuming that that db(m)/dm = b′(m) > 0,
a player will participate as long as the number of voluntary contributors is such
that: b′(m) > c.6We then examine two cases.
First, there are increasing returns to scale in coordination benefits over the
whole range of possible participants: b′′(m) > 0. We further and crucially as-
sume that b′(1) < c, implying that, if no other country imposes conditionality,
a particular country will never find it profitable to do it alone. Finally, we
assume that cooperating always provide a net benefit when N-1 players partic-
ipate, b′(N − 1) > c. Under these conditions, there exists a critical number of
countries, m∗, such that b′(m) > c for m ≥ m∗. Once a certain number of
other players agree to contribute to aid coordination, a particular country has
an incentive to follow suit since the cost of its individual contribution is less
than its marginal individual benefit. In other words, as long as at least m∗
other players contribute, a particular country prefers to join the collective effort
to free riding and none of the cooperating countries has an incentive to stop
doing so.
In such a game, there are two possible (Nash) equilibria (in pure strategies):
no coordination takes place or every country agrees to join the coordination
scheme. We are in an Assurance Game: if a particular country expects that no
other country will join the aid coordinating effort, it will not contribute either,
yet if it expects that a sufficiently large number of other countries are ready to
contribute, it will also contribute, and this corresponds to the efficient outcome.
The problem is slightly more complex if we assume that increasing returns
to scale in the provision of coordination benefits are succeeded by decreasing
returns, so that b′′(m) < 0 beyond some value of m. Thus, the additional
benefit of participation in the coordinating group when there already are m
participants, b’(m), increases and then decreases, such as is illustrated in Figure
1.7 An upper threshold, m∗∗, is now added to the lower threshold, m∗. Below
m∗, and above m∗∗, the individual marginal benefit of participation falls short
of the cost c. The two possible (Nash) equilibria are now: m = 0 and m = m∗∗:
either no one contributes, or m∗∗ potential participants do contribute. The first
outcome will be observed if countries expect that less than m∗ other countries
are going to participate in the coordination effort. The second, more favourable
outcome happens if the expectation is that at least m∗ other individuals or
countries are going to join this collective effort.
6In a discrete framework, this condition would write: b(m)–b(m− 1) >c
7Note that for the problem not to be trivial, it is assumed in Figure 1 that b′(m) goes
through a maximum greater than c and falls below c for large enough values of m.
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Figure 1: Coordination equilibria in the presence of two thresholds
If the total group size, N , is smaller than m∗∗, every potential participant
joins the coordinating scheme. But if N exceeds m∗∗, the public good is only
produced by a subgroup of individuals or countries. In that case, it is not even
clear that m∗∗ is a Nash equilibrium since every participant will be tempted to
join the N −m∗∗ free riders. Moreover, when N > m∗∗, the outcome charac-
terized by m∗∗ coordinating participants is socially inefficient. 8
Our next step is to acknowledge that coordination is not simply a binary
variable (whether aid coordination takes place or not) but a continuous variable
that can take on different values depending on the number of participating
countries and the extent to which aid efforts are coordinated by them. Let
us assume that all the member states of a pre-existing club, say the European
Union, have agreed on coordinating their aid efforts. There remains the question
of how far they are ready to go in the direction of aid coordination.
8The optimal number of contributors is the value m° that maximizes Nb(m)–mc. The
collectively rational outcome thus requires that the collective marginal benefit is equal to the
marginal cost, that is, Nb′(m°) = c. This is to be compared to the individually rational (Nash)
outcome, m∗∗, which is by definition such that b′(m∗∗) = c. Bearing in mind the assumption
of decreasing returns, it is evident that m° > m∗∗.
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3.2 The trade-off between aid effectiveness and political
independence
Intensification of aid coordination efforts is expected to (1°) reduce the transac-
tion costs borne by each individual donor country; (2°) enhance aid effectiveness
in the sense of better reaching the donor’s objectives in the recipient countries;
and (3°) entail a political cost in the form of a loss of national autonomy in deal-
ing with particular aid recipient countries. This cost may be of a diplomatic
nature, as coordinating with other donors means giving up strategic levers on
the action of recipient countries’ governments. It may also be political by con-
veying the idea of a loss of political independence, or sovereignty in the public
opinion of the donor country. There is thus a trade-off between aid coordina-
tion benefits –cost-saving and governance effects− and this political cost. How
the equilibrium level of coordination will be set depends on the countries’ pref-
erences regarding their political independence and the weight they attach to
poverty reduction in developing countries. Such preferences can be represented
by conventional indifference curves, such as those shown in Figure 3, where the
extent of political independence is measured along the horizontal axis while the
amount of development aid effectively reaching the poor (labeled effective aid)
is measured along the vertical axis.
The willingness to exchange political control against aid for the poor dimin-
ishes sharply when a great measure of political control has already been lost
and, conversely, such willingness is greatest when the country concerned still
retains a lot of political control. The equilibrium level of coordination will be
determined by the tangency between an indifference curve, on the one hand,
and a ’possibility curve’ (dotted line in Figure 3) showing the amount of effec-
tive aid that can be achieved for a given loss of political control, on the other
hand. The latter allows for the fact that, as aid is better coordinated, (1°)
the net amount of aid available to the recipient countries increases thanks to
a reduction in transaction costs, (2°) a larger portion of the (net) aid amount
reaches the poor thanks to improved governance of the recipient country, but
(3°) political control diminishes.
As pictured in Figure 3, donor countries can be expected to have heteroge-
neous preferences. In particular, big and small countrie tend to incur different
costs when they raise their coordination effort. Big countries tend to assign
much greater weight to considerations of political sovereignty and control than
smaller ones, if only because they are more able to design strategies that serve
their own national interests. An indifference curve for a small donor country
(the dashed line) is rather flat over most of its range, indicating that, in order
to increase the amount of effective aid, this country is ready to surrender large
measures of political independence. The situation is exactly opposite for big
countries which tend to exact a high price, in terms of effective aid, to agree to
forego even small amounts of political control and independence.
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Figure 2: The trade-off between political independence and aid effectiveness
when aid efforts can be coordinated: big versus small countries
3.3 Two remarks
Two remarks need to be made before turning our attention to our model of
aid coordination. First, cost-savings resulting from donor coordination do not
accrue only to donor countries but also benefit recipient countries directly -e.g.
less pressure on high-level staff as mentioned in section 2. Therefore, if donor
countries internalize the latter in their cost-benefit calculus, aid coordination
will appear more profitable to them. Yet, there are also disadvantages caused
by intensified aid coordination for the recipient country. In particular, a loss
of sovereignty or ‘ownership’ is suffered as a result of the more rigorous imple-
mentation of conditionalities by coordinating donors. We nevertheless choose to
ignore this aspect on the ground that it does not necessarily serve the interests
of the poor who are the target of development aid.
Second, because of the emergence of new donor countries (China, Saudi
Arabia, Brazil, etc.) or organizations (private foundations), Western donor
countries and Japan now hold a diminishing part of the aid share in many
developing countries. As a consequence, there are significant additional bene-
fits to be reaped from the enlarging of the space of coordination through the
inclusion of those new aid actors. They ought not to be over-estimated, how-
ever. As a matter of fact, the assumption of increasing returns is likely to be
over-optimistic as far as some big new actors in the ‘aid market’ are concerned.
Instead of the Assurance Game, the game with external aid donor agencies
may resemble a Prisoner’s Dilemma. This means that donor agencies may be
better off free riding on the coordination efforts of other donors than joining
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these efforts to reduce transaction costs and improve conditionality. It is thus
a well-established fact that “many African leaders have embraced the Chinese,
especially when offered vast loans for infrastructure projects. By contrast, the
leaders say, Western governments these days offer little more than lectures on
good governance” (The Economist, 2011).9
It is true that the present set-up ignores the utility function of the recipient
country and does not delve into the incentive aspects of aid coordination for
recipient countries’ governments. Its governance-disciplining efforts are rather
crudely summarized in a reduced-form function that specifies elite capture as
negatively related to the intensity of aid-coordinating efforts. Compared to
Torsvik’s model sumarized above, these simplifications allow us to explore other
aspects of the aid coordination problem. In particular, the effects of the presence
of political costs of aid coordination and heterogeneity of donor countries can
be highlighted in a systematic manner.
Having thus sketched the broad setup of our theory, we are now ready to
present its details and main results, starting with the simple case of identical
donor countries (Section 4), and then proceeding with the more realistic case of
heterogeneous countries (Section 5).
4 The case of identical donor countries
We consider the case of a fixed number,m, of identical donor countries belonging
to a pre-existing club (say, the European Union) that have to choose the level
or intensity of their aid coordination effort. We denote by ei the effort made
by country i in coordinating aid in the club, e.g. collecting and exchanging
information with other members on the effectiveness of its aid projects, sticking
to collective recommendations, etc.. . We assume that 0 ≤ ei ≤ a, so that the
coordination effort of a particular country cannot exceed a certain finite value,
say because political independence goes to 0 when ei → a. The assumption
that all donor countries are identical means, in our context, that they have the
same preference, the same aid budget, and the same cost function. We define
Ti as the aid budget of country i, Ci as its transaction cost of delivering aid,
Zi as the measure of its political independence or sovereignty. Moreover, the
share of the net aid budget, Ti − Ci accruing to the target group (the poor)
in the recipient country, denoted by α, is an increasing function of the overall
coordination effort by donors (α′() < 0). Assuming that a country’s utility
function is a Cobb-Douglas, and taking the aid budget, Ti, as given, we are
then able to write the maximizing problem of the donor country i as:
Max
ei
Ui = A
βi
i Z
1−βi
i
9Yet, it would seem that “growing numbers of Africans are turning against the saviours
from the East”, in part because the Chinese too often indulge in corrupt practices in collusion
with local officials and inspectors (Leader “Rumble in the jungle”, April 23rd-29th 2011).
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where Ai = α(ei +
∑
j 6=i
ej)
Ti − C
Ti, ei +∑
j 6=i
ej
 ; Zi = Z(ei)
Thus, Ai represents the effective transfer of donor i to the poor in the recipient
country.
As specified above, βi (identical for all countries) is the parameter measuring
the intensity of the preference of country i for poverty reduction, which is the
objective of aid. The inverse, 1−βi, is therefore the weight attached to political
sovereignty or national power and prestige. The value of βi determines the shape
of the indifference curves. The higher it is, the flatter is the indifference curve,
as shown in Figure 3.
Coordination efforts have two beneficial effects, reducing transaction costs
and improving the targeting of aid, and one negative consequence, a loss of
political sovereignty. The targeting improvement and the political loss are taken
into account in the utility function above. The transaction cost, C, of delivering
aid for country i is specified as an increasing function of the aid budget, Ti, and
a decreasing function of the aggregate coordination efforts of all donor countries,
E = ei +
∑
j 6=i
ej . We thus have: C1i > 0; C2i < 0, with the upperscript indicating
the first derivative of the cost function with respect to either its first or second
argument. Finally, the loss of political sovereignty suffered by country i as a
result of aid coordination depends only on its own individual coordination effort,
ei implying that Z ′(ei) < 0.
We look for a symmetrical Nash equilibrium of the game played by the m
donor countries. Hence country i considers the coordination efforts of the other
countries as given while it maximizes its utility, Ui. To solve this problem, it is
convenient to take the logarithmic form of the utility function:
Max
ei
LogUi =
βiLog
α(ei +∑
j 6=i
ej)
Ti − C
Ti, ei +∑
j 6=i
ej
+ (1− βi)LogZi(ei)
Since coordination efforts are identical for all countries at equilibrium (e∗1 =
e∗2 = ... = e
∗), we can drop all lowerscripts and write the solution as:
β
[
α′(me∗)
α(me∗)
− C
2(T,me∗)
T − C(T,me∗)
]
= −(1− β)Z
′(e∗)
Z(e∗)
(1)
At equilibrium, the marginal benefit of coordination is equal to the marginal
cost, each being weighted by its corresponding elasticity in the utility function.
The two components of the benefit show up in the LHS, the gain in targeting the
poor and the reduction in the transaction per additional unit of coordination
effort. The RHS features the marginal cost of coordination in the form of a loss
of political sovereignty.
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To obtain unambiguous comparative-static results, we must make a number
of additional yet realistic assumptions about the signs of second derivatives.
They are as follows: α”( ) < 0; C22( ) > 0; Z”( ) < 0. In words, we assume
that there are decreasing marginal returns to the provision of aid coordination
in terms of both the quality of targeting and transaction-cost savings, and that
the marginal disutility of losing political independence increases with coordina-
tion. Under these conditions, it can easily be checked that, in accordance with
intuition:
δe∗/δβ > 0; δe∗/δm < 0
To see how the equilibrium coordination effort depends on the aid budget,
an additional assumption is needed on the cost function, namely that, at equi-
librium:
∂Log(T − C(T,me))
∂T
≥ 0; ∂
∂e
∂Log(T − C(T,me))
∂T
≤ 0 (2)
The first condition reasonably requires that, when the aid budget increases by
one unit, the cost increases by less than one unit. If this were not the case,
then the aid actually tranferred to the recipient country would diminish with
the total budget. The second assumption states that the proportional increase
in the net amount of aid - i.e. budget minus transaction cost - due to an increase
in the aid budget decreases when coordination is more intense. This assumption
may be rewritten as:
C2(1− C1)− C21(T − C) ≤ 0
As the fisrt term on the LHS of that inequality is negative - i.e. (1 − C1) is
positive as implied by the first inequality in (2)- this condition is automatically
satisfied if C21 = 0, that is to say if coordination reduces only the fixed cost
part of the transaction cost. If coordination is assumed to reduce the variable
cost part too, then condition (2) requires C21 not to be too negative.10
Under the preceding simple assumptions, it is easily shown through differ-
entiating the first order condition (1) that the coordination efforts decline with
the aid budget:
δe∗/δT < 0
These various results are summarized in Proposition 1 below:
Proposition 1: Under reasonable assumptions, the incentive to coordinate
aid efforts increases (1°) when a country has a stronger preference for poverty
reduction compared to considerations of national sovereignty and prestige, (2°)
10To see that this condition is not unduly restrictive, consider the following reasonable
(bilinear) specification of the transaction cost: C = (a − γE) + (b − βE)T (with E < b/β),
where E(= me) in the symmetrical equilibrium. In that expression, the first term stands for
the fixed transaction cost whereas (b−βE) is the variable cost per unit of the total aid budget.
Thus, both the fixed cost and the variable cost decline with E. With that expression, it is
easily established that condition (2) is always satisfied within a reasonable range of T .
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when the size of the coordinating club of donor countries is smaller, and (3°)
when the size of the individual aid budget is lower.
The intuition of these results is simple. First, when the donor country
attaches marginally more importance to its altruistic objective of poverty re-
duction, it increases its level of coordination effort at equilibrium. And, con-
versely, if it attaches marginally more importance to its political independence
and national interests. Second, the presence of one more country in the aid-
coordinating club induces other participating donor countries to decrease the
level of their coordination effort. A donor country thus “exploits” the presence
of an additional member country to reduce its own political cost of aid coor-
dination. Third, a decrease in the budget that each individual donor country
dedicates to poverty reduction prompts an intensification of its coordination ef-
fort. This is because, under assumption (2), the fall in the cost of aid delivery
obtained through more coordination represents a larger share of the actual aid,
(T − C), when the total budget, T , is restricted - i.e. the second term on the
LHS of (1) increases with T . As the marginal gain of coordination is now higher,
the marginal cost must increase at equilibrium, which requires an increase in
the coordination effort. Thus, the coordination effort falls when the aid budget
increases.To complete our analysis of the case of identical donor countries, three
remarks are in order. To begin with, the preceding proposition and equilibrium
condition (1) hold only for an interior solution, which imposes some restrictions
on the parameters β, T, m, namely:
β
1− β ≤
−Z ′(a)/Z(a)
α′(m)/α(m)− C2(T,ma)/ [T − C(T,ma)]
Less than maximum coordination effort , a, will be chosen only if the preference
for effective aid relative to political independence is not too high and if the
number of donors in the club and/or the amount of aid is large enough.
The second remark makes a straightforward point: if inside the club an
authority (say, the European Commission) exists that can choose the level of
coordination and impose it on all members, that level should correspond to its
maximum possible value. Indeed, the authority ought to neglect the political
costs of aid coordination and maximize the aggregate amount of (European) aid
reaching the poor, that is:
Max
e
W = α(me) [m (T − C(T,me)]
Since there is no cost of coordination internalized by the authority, it will obvi-
ously choose the corner solution e˜ = a.
Our third remark draws attention to an interesting equivalence result. As-
sume that the objective function of each donor country in the club is that of
a pure rather than an impure altruist. In other words, each donor’s utility is
positively influenced by the amount of aid that reaches the poor, whichever the
source the aid actually comes from (provided that aid comes from within the
club). The donor’s problem is then:
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Max
ei
LogUi =
βiLog
α(ei +∑
j 6=i
ej)
mT − C
T, ei +∑
j 6=i
ej
−∑
j 6=i
C
T, ej +∑
k 6=j
ek

+ (1− βi)LogZi(ei)
The solution of this problem is given byexactly the same equilibrium con-
dition as that obtained with the impure altruistic country (see equation (1)).
This means that the level of individual coordination efforts is not affected by
whether donor countries value the aid given to the poor by other member coun-
tries. Note however that this behavioral equivalence between pure and impure
altruism is conditional on all donors being identical.
5 The case of heterogeneous donor countries
We assume that there are two types of countries, big and small countries. The
big countries (labeled type 1) have greater aid budgets than the smaller ones
(labeled type 2) and they also have a stronger preference for political indepen-
dence: T1 > T2, and β1 < β2. In accordance with what has been found in
Section 4, these assumptions imply that, were they allowed to impose their own
preferred choices, the big countries would opt for a lower coordination level than
the small countries. The same outcome would obtain if we assumed straight-
away that countries of type 1 have a weaker preference for poverty reduction
than those of type 2, and all countries are of the same size (in terms of aid
budget). What will actually happen in a heterogeneous coalition will depend
on the prevailing decision mechanism. There are several possibilities here.
The first possibility hardly requires comments: if there exists an authority
able to impose the coordination level that best meets the objective of aid, it
will choose the maximum level, a, so that targeting of the poor is achieved
in the best possible manner. This solution is obviously closer to the choice
favored by the small countries. It is not very realistic, however, to assume that
the club’s authority, if it exists, is able to enforce a coordination level that
ignores political costs. It may thus be content with setting a level, e∗, that
maximizes the aggregate utility of the member countries. Assuming, for the
sake of convenience, that there is an identical number of big and small countries
inside the club (m1 = m2) allows us to write the authority’s maximization
problem simply as:
Max
e
W = β1Log {α (me) [T1 − C(T1,me)]}+ (1− β1)LogZ(e)
+β2Log {α (me) [T2 − C(T2,me)]}+ (1− β2)LogZ(e),
17
where m = m1 +m2. The equilibrium condition is then:
mβ1
[
α′ (me∗)
α (me∗)
− C
2 (T1,me
∗)
T1 − C (T1,me∗)
]
+mβ2
[
α′ (me∗)
α (me∗)
− C
2 (T2,me
∗)
T2 − C (T2,me∗)
]
= −Z
′ (e∗)
Z (e∗)
(2− β1 − β2) (3)
The second approach does not rely on the presence of a centralized authority:
big and small countries bargain together in order to arrive at a commonly agreed
coordination level which by definition has to be unique. Because big countries
have larger aid budgets, it is rather natural to think that they wield more power
in the bargaining process so that the coordination level ought to better reflect
their preferences than those of the small countries. For example, in the setup of
two countries (or two groups of countries), we can think of the problem as that
of solving the following Nash bargaining game in which bargaining strength is
assumed to be a function of the size of aid budget:
Max
e
(U1 − U1)T1 (U2 − U2)T2 , (4)
where U1 stands for the reservation utility of big countries and U2 stands for
that of small countries (we can actually think of the club as made of two coun-
tries only, one big and one small). Before concluding that the interest of the
big countries will always be better reflected in the equilibrium level of coordi-
nation, we must nevertheless check whether U1 exceeds U2. The reservation
utility of a big country, which provides its threat point, can be conceived as
the utility that it could achieve if the negotiation with small countries collapsed
and big countries coordinated their aid efforts among themselves, without any
externality between their aid programmes and that of small donors. We reason
analogously for the definition of the reservation utility of a small country. We
can then write that:
LogU1 = β1Log {α (m1e∗1) [T1 − C(T1,m1e∗1)]}+ (1− β1)LogZ(e∗1)
LogU2 = β2Log {α (m2e∗2) [T2 − C(T2,m2e∗2)]}+ (1− β2)LogZ(e∗2)
We know that e∗1 < e∗2 and β1 < β2. It follows that (1−β2)LogZ(e∗2) < (1−
β1)LogZ(e
∗
1). Regarding the first term in the above expressions, it is also evident
that β2Log [α2] > β1Log [α1]. Therefore, whatever the relative values of the net
amounts of aid, (Ti−Ci), we cannot rule out the possibility that the reservation
utility of the small countries is higher than that of the big countries. If that
is the case, whether the small countries succeed in negotiating a coordination
level closer to their own preferred level will depend upon the magnitude of
T1 relative to T2. Indeed, the difference between T1 and T2 determines not
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only the magnitude of the gap between T1 − C1 and T2 − C2 and hence the
gap between reservation utilities (for a given coordination effort), but also the
respective bargaining strengths of the two types of donor countries as indicated
by equation (4). We can therefore state the following proposition:
Proposition 2: When the club of aid-coordinating countries is heterogeneous
in the sense that it includes both big and small countries, and when the agreed
coordination level is the outcome of a Nash bargaining process, this level may
be closer to the level preferred by either the small or the big donor countries.
A key role in determining the result is played by the relative sizes of the aid
budgets: the larger the aid budget of the big countries compared to that of the
small countries, the more likely the former will be able to tilt the coordination
effort level in the direction of their preference.
A third possibility that we may want to consider is the following: the big
countries are strong enough to impose their own conception of coordination
yet subject to the participation constraint of the small countries. Since by
assumption there is an equal number of big and small countries, the problem
can be simply written as:
MaxLog
e
U1 = β1Log {α(me) [T1 − C(T1,me)]}+ (1− β1)LogZ(e)
s.t. β2Log {α(me) [T2 − C(T2,me)]}+ (1− β2)LogZ(e) ≥ LogU2
Three cases can then arise. In the first case, the participation constraint
of the small country is not binding and the equilibrium coordination level, e˜,
satisfies the equation below:
β1m
(
α′ (me˜)
α (me˜)
− C
2 (T1,me˜)
T1 − C (T1,me˜)
)
= −(1− β1)Z
′ (e˜)
Z (e˜)
(5)
In the second case, the small country’s participation constraint is binding
and the solution, eˆ, solves the following equation:
LogU2 = β2Log {α (meˆ) [T2 − C (T2,meˆ)]}+ (1− β2)LogZ(eˆ)
This case is all the more likely to arise as the discrepancy between the two
stand-alone preferred coordination levels, e∗1 and e∗2, is large. If this gap is too
wide, a third case can arise because the solution eˆ may actually fail to satisfy
the participation constraint of the big country itself. In this case, satisfying
the small country’s participation constraint may prove too costly for the big
countries in which case they would prefer to form a coordination subgroup
among themselves.
That aid coordination is constrained by big rather than small donor countries
directly follows from our assumptions and is reflected in the result e˜ < e∗(see
Appendix I for the proof). In words, the level of coordination and, therefore,
the amount of aid reaching the poor are higher when coordination is chosen by a
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club’s authority maximizing the aggregate welfare of the member countries than
when it is chosen by the big countries in an unconstrained manner. Furthermore,
when they are allowed to impose their preferred coordination level, and this can
again be done in an unconstrained manner, the big countries unambiguously
prefer that solution to the stand-alone situation. Formally, we have that U1 (e˜) >
U1 (e
∗
1). This results from three effects working in the same direction. Joining
hands with the small countries has the effect of raising m.e so that targeting is
improved (α rises) and transaction-costs are reduced (C1 falls). In addition, the
fall of e induced by the enlarged size of the aid-coordinating group (from m1 to
2m1) causes the political cost of coordination to decrease (Z falls).
To establish the above, we just need to show that δ (m.e) /δm > 0 despite
the fact that δe/δm < 0. This requires that the elasticity ηe,m = (δe/δm) (m/e)
be larger than −1. It is proven in Appendix II that this is indeed the case. We
can therefore state the following proposition:
Proposition 3: When the differences between β1 and β2, and between T1
and T2 are not too large, so that the big donor countries, if allowed to, can
impose their preferred level of coordination in an unconstrained manner, they
will always be better off following this way than standing alone. The resulting
coordination level, however, will be lower than if it were chosen by a club’s
authority maximizing the aggregate welfare of both big and small countries. As
a consequence, the amount of aid reaching the poor in the aid recipient country
will also be smaller in the first than in the second situation.
6 The case study of Mali11
Since Mali has been selected by the Committee for Development Aid of the
OECD as pilot country to initiate a review of aid effectiveness in 1996, several
steps have been taken to reform aid practices and to set up new local institu-
tions. In particular, various commissions, groups, and mechanisms have been
put into place to facilitate the exchange of information and the coordination
of aid efforts both between donor agencies and between them and the govern-
ment of Mali. In addition to the streamlining of conditionalities and project
specialization among donor agencies (with a leading donor assigned to each aid
sector), there was a real effort by European donors to foster continuous dialogue
with the government of Mali so that it could assume leadership in defining de-
velopment objectives and strategies. Institutional or organizational innovations
also aimed at rationalizing aid delivery,follow-up and evaluation procedures, at
stabilizing aid flows in a multi-year perspective so as to allow more predictable
budgetary projections, and at improving budgetary procedures in the host coun-
try to increase transparency and make planning more effective. The idea of
joint programming became a central plank in the new strategy to support the
11We want to express our gratitude to Anne-Caroline Burnet from CRED, University of
Namur, who has collaborated with us in conducting the interviews in Mali, and to Hervé
Bougault, head of the local office of the Agence Française de Développement, who has orga-
nized many of the meetings during which the required information was collected.
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so-called Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction (CSCRP) for
the years 2002-2006, 2007-2011, and 2012-2017. Actual coordination rests on
three distinct levels: the global, the sectoral, and the sub-sectoral levels, all of
them involving different mechanisms and group meetings.
Evaluation of the experience to this date has been carried out by a team of
experts and reported in the « Rapport Final - Evaluation nationale de la mise
en œuvre de la Déclaration de Paris (phase 2) », Ministère de l’Economie et des
Finances (MEF). Their observations as well as those resulting from our own
field interviews during the month of July 2011 suggest a number of interesting
lessons that are summarized and discussed below.
There have been genuine efforts to share information among donors, partic-
ularly between countries of the European Union, and between donors and the
government of Mali. This helped to increase trust between donors and the aid
recipient country. Coordination works relatively well at the sub-sector level,
particularly in the health and education sectors, and it is especially effective
when it comes to sharing information and diagnoses, and to discussing joint ap-
proaches to follow up and evaluation. Also appreciated is the work of the Pool
Technique, a cell of technical support created by the donors to help harmonize
their aid efforts and prepare their consultations with national authorities. The
existence of this mechanism causes a significant reduction of transaction costs
for the donors as well as for the host government which can talk with only one
interlocutor acting on behalf of all the donors.
Yet, despite the numerous institutions and mechanisms created towards fos-
tering harmonization of aid efforts, results have been essentially disappointing.
Central weaknesses are the following:
- The indecisiveness and lack of leadership of the recipient government have
weakened the coordination mechanisms
- Dispersion of roles and duplication of structures in charge of the manage-
ment of aid efforts have remained important.
- Some donor agencies have refused to align themselves on the new mecha-
nisms, and new donors have been particularly reluctant to join the coordination
efforts, mainly because their interventions are focused on projects.
- Donors remain unwilling to pool financial resources with a view to funding
common initiatives.
- Donors, especially from big countries, remain strongly reluctant to slim
down parallel structures through which they used to deal with local authorities
(e.g., diplomatic and political channels). Furthermore, because of deep-rooted
habits of autonomy on the part of national aid agencies, the EU Code of Conduct
on the Complementarity and Division of Labor is not easily put into practice.
By refusing to forsake part of their national prerogatives, these donors prevent
the realization of possible savings in transaction costs.
Some of the above conclusions deserve further comments. To start with,
not all European countries appear to be on the same wavelength regarding
the approach to development aid. This is in spite of the fact that they all
support the Paris Declaration process. Some countries (Denmark, Sweden, and
the Netherlands) tend to give preference to coordination with non-European
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countries (such as Canada) which they deem closer to their own aid philosophy.
One major point of division among European countries actually concerns the
role of the General Budget Support (GBS) strategy (with Germany, France, and
Belgium more supportive than the three aforementioned countries), implying the
existence of divergent opinions regarding the usefulness of conditionality. It is
interesting to note that the budget support approach remains well below the
expectations of the government of Mali in terms of both aid volume- 12 per cent
of the whole EU aid budget in Mali - and number of donors involved.
Second, the Delegation of the EU in Mali is relatively strict when it comes
to deciding the suspension of aid for budget support whenever the outcome
indicators prove disappointing. Variable tranches are then not disbursed till the
indicators improve or the government takes up measures toward that end. Yet,
not all donors feel comfortable with this approach and some of them consider
the EU’s policy too harsh. During two consecutive years, the Delegation has
thus suspended its aid to Mali but was alone in doing it. Other donor agencies
disagreed with the indicators used by the Delegation to reach its decision, or
with their interpretation or measurement. A more serious problem arises from
the fact that disbursement decisions depend on individual decisions made by
donors. In other words, the donors consult with each other to decide whether
the agreed-on indicators have been satisfied (a hard process in itself), but the
actual disbursement of the money at stake is left to the appreciation of each
donor. This lack of coordination about the manner in which non-fulfillment of
conditions set by the donors is followed up at the level of actual disbursement
decisions is a serious obstacle to effective aid coordination.
Third, rationalization of donor missions to the field has barely begun and
parallel units subsist. Thus, 60 such units for the implementation of rural
development projects have been recorded for the year 2008, as against 65 in
2006. For another thing, only 15 percent of the project/program interventions
for rural development were carried out under the aegis of joint programs in
2009, a figure to be compared to the set objective of 66 percent for 2010. In
reality, there is no such thing as a joint basket of donor interventions. Joint
missions have not increased either: most donor agencies continue to organize
their field missions separately. In addition, few projects (only 22 of them in
2009, representing 20 percent of the total) have been co-financed by several
donors (the proportion was 18 percent in 2008). Finally, 58 percent of the
projects/programs of rural development financed by European agencies were
keeping a parallel management unit.
Fourth, some donors refuse to use national systems and procedures on the
ground that they are not compatible with international norms and are unreliable
and inefficient. Thus, the share of OECD donors’ aid that follows the national
procedures of budgetary implementation, financial monitoring and control was
only 30 percent in 2010. This is actually a regression from the figure of 34
percent recorded for the years 2007-2009. Where the situation is clearly better
is in matters of alignment of donor aid on national objectives and priorities: 73
percent of OECD public aid in 2007 were obeying national priorities (60 percent
in 2005). Quality of national systems of budgetary planning, financial manage-
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ment and market adjudication is a key aspect conditioning donors’ alignment
on them. In 2009, only 37 percent of development aid allocated to the public
sector were properly adjudicated through open calls, as against 45 percent in
2005. In contrast, 40 percent went through the national system of public finance
in 2009, as against 29 percent in 2005 and 34 percent in 2007: this increase was
essentially caused by the increase in the number of donors practicing budget
support.
A last aspect deserves to be emphasized. The involvement of the government
of Mali remains weak and its appropriation of the Paris Declaration process is
far from satisfactory. The country still lacks a genuine national strategy toward
development aid and the government seems unable to conceptualize its own view
about national development priorities. It tends to rely on the ideas, proposals
and prescriptions coming from the donor agencies without setting them against
a list of objectives set by itself in consultation with the local population. It is
therefore not surprising that a definition of budgetary guidelines toward meet-
ing objectives is altogether absent. Participation of the private sector and the
civil society is entirely achieved through sector-level groups. Communication of
information between the government of Mali and the donors is deficient, and
information management at the level of the government itself is lacking in many
respects. As a result of these weaknesses and the persisting duplication of aid
management structures, aid efforts and outcomes remain hardly transparent.
7 Conclusion
Aid coordination is a very desirable objective, in particular because it can re-
duce the costs of delivering and monitoring aid (the transaction cost effect) and
improve the targeting of the poor (the governance effect). The latter effect is
achieved through more effective disciplining of the central or local governments
and agencies in the host countries. In practice, however, we observe too little
of such aid coordination. This paper has drawn attention to some of the most
awkward problems that plague attempts to coordinate or harmonize aid efforts.
First, even when the problem of aid coordination is seen as a ’pure’ coordination
problem, coordination ought not to be taken for granted. As a matter of fact,
donor countries may fail to coordinate because, in the absence of a centralized
decision-mechanism, they do not expect that other countries, or enough other
countries, will join the coordinating group.
Second, aid coordination involves incentive problems that exhibit the struc-
ture of a Prisoner’s Dilemma rather than a pure coordination game. Serious
problems of free riding need to be overcome.
Third, as attested by our case study of Mali, donor countries may take po-
litical costs seriously into account when they decide about the level or intensity
of aid coordination efforts they want to apply. A trade-off is thereby created
between costs and benefits of coordination and the equilibrium level of coor-
dination that donor countries want is far from optimal from the standpoint of
aid targeting and aid outreach. Absent these political costs (and provided that
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’pure’ coordination problems are surmounted), greater coordination of aid ef-
forts would lead to lower transaction costs (of delivering and monitoring aid)
and higher shares of the aid budgets reaching the target groups.
As soon as political costs are acknowledged, an interesting issue emerges
in so far as all donor countries do not value political costs in the same way.
The question then arises as to how a group of heterogeneous countries will
choose a necessarily unique level of aid coordination inside the club. Different
scenarios are possible and some are more favourable than others to aid effec-
tiveness through better coordination of donors’ aid efforts. Empirical research
regarding the actual processes of decision-making inside (potential) clubs of aid-
coordinating countries is still in its infancy, and one may hope that in the near
future our knowledge in this respect will improve. Only then will we be able
to better understand which scenarios are more relevant and what consequences
follow from them.
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Appendix I
The equilibrium condition (3), which maximizes the aggregate welfare of big
and small donor countries, can be written thus:
β1B1 + β2B2 = − Z
′ (e∗)
mZ (e∗)
(2− β1 − β2)
where Bi =
[
α′ (me∗)
α (me∗)
− C
2
i (Ti,me
∗)
Ti − Ci (Ti,me∗)
]
Because β1B1 < β2B2, the above equality implies the following inequality:
− Z
′ (e∗)
mZ (e∗)
(2− β1 − β2) > 2β1B1
Let us now reason ex absurdo. If e∗ were a solution for the problem in
which big countries impose, in an unconstrained manner, their preferred level
of coordination, it would satisfy equation (5) and we could infer that:
β1B1 = − (1− β1) Z
′ (e∗)
mZ (e∗)
< −1
2
Z ′ (e∗)
mZ (e∗)
(2− β1 − β2) ,
which simplifies thus:
1− β1 < 1
2
(2− β1 − β2)
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This inequality implies that β1 > (β1 + β2) /2, which is impossible since
β1 < β2 by assumption. We conclude that e˜ must be different from e∗. It must
actually be the case that e˜ is smaller than e∗so as to raise the value of B1 and,
therefore, β1B1:
e˜ < e∗ =⇒
β1
[
α′ (me˜)
α (me˜)
− C
2
i (Ti,me˜)
Ti − Ci (Ti,me˜)
]
> β1
[
α′ (me∗)
α (me∗)
− C
2
i (Ti,me
∗)
Ti − Ci (Ti,me∗)
]
Appendix II
Let us start from the stand-alone equilibrium condition for the big countries,
equation (5), which we write thus:
Λ1 = β1
[
α′ (m1e∗1)
α (m1e∗1)
− C
2
1 (T1,m1e
∗
1)
T1 − C1 (T1,m1e∗1)
]
+ (1− β1) Z
′ (e∗1)
Z (e∗1)
= 0
We want to find the expression for δe∗1/δm1, where the variation of m1 is
construed as a variation in the size of the club of aid-coordinating countries
(actually enlarged to include the small countries).
We find that:
δΛ1
δe1
= β1m1
[
α′(−)α”(−)− (α′(−))2
(α(−))2 −
(T1 − C1(−))C221 (−) +
(
C21 (−)
)2
(T1 − C1(−))2
]
+ (1− β1)
[
Z(−)Z”(−)− (Z ′(−))2
(Z(−))2
]
< 0
δΛ1
δm1
= β1e1
[
α′(−)α”(−)− (α′(−))2
(α(−))2 −
(T1 − C1(−))C221 (−) +
(
C21 (−)
)2
(T1 − C1(−))2
]
< 0
We thus immediately obtain the required expression:
−δΛ1/δm1
δΛ1/δe1
=
δe1
δm1
= − e1β1X
m1β1X + (1− β1)
(
ZZ”−(Z′)2
Z2
) ,
where X =
[
α′α”− (α′)2
α2
− (T1 − C1)C
22
1 +
(
C21
)2
(T1 − C1)2
]
< 0
Note that since X < 0, the above expression implies that δe1/δm1 < 0. Di-
viding both the numerator and denominator bym1β1X, we obtain the following,
more elegant expression:
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− δe1
δm1
=
e1/m1
1 + µ
,
where µ =
(
1− β1
m1β1X
)(
ZZ”− (Z ′)2
Z2
)
> 0
The elasticity of e1with respect to m1writes therefore as:
ηe1,m1 =
δe1
δm1
m1
e1
= − 1
1 + µ
,
which is higher than -1, or smaller than +1 in absolute value. It follows that
δ(m1e1)/δm1 > 0. QED
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